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• The radicalisatiori of black politics on the Rand during and
immediately after the First World War has often been noted by
writers on South Africa. Simons1, Benson2, Walshe3, Wickens4,
Caris and Carter5, Roux6, Legassick7, Johnstone8, to mention
but the most important, have all commented on the rising tide
of militancy in this period, and have tried in varying degrees
to identify the growing contradictions which it expressed.
Accounts of the origins of the movement share a number of
points in common: the growing impoverishment of the reserves
(whether it be explained in terms of structural underdevelop-
ment or merely contingent effects of droughts); the rise of a
concentrated black urban proletariat as a result of the
secondary industrialisation promoted by the war; the
concomitant shortage of housing and the emergence of teeming
urban slums; the steeply rising cost of living during the war
and the simultaneous pegging of black wages at pre-World War I
levels; various direct and indirect taxations-brr African
earnings; the example of white worker action, and the
continued inflexibility of the job colour bar. Needless to
say there is great unevenness of treatment in these accounts.
Walshe, for example, lists a number of factors - the experience
of black soldiers in Europe; increases in cost of living;
droughts; the flow of migrants from the reserves; slums; the
pass laws; increased post-war taxation; reduced expenditure
on African schools; shootings of Africans and lenient white
juries; displacement of African interpreters; racial
discrimination on railways and in post offices - to which he
appears to give roughly commensurate weight.9 Johnstone, by
contrast, attempts a strucural explanation, examining the
interconnections between migrant labour, pass laws, the ;
compound system and the particular exigencies of the war-time
economy in identifying the well-springs of discontent-10
Wickens on the other hand almost entirely ignores the processes
of rural degredation, and so one could go on. Nevertheless,
the interpretations provided are not mutually contradictory,
and it.is possible to stitch together a "composite account.
The same cannot be said of the shape and dynamics of the
movements which were spawned by these pressures, and more par-
ticularly of the role and class basis of the Transvaal Native
Congress (T.N.C.). Here two broad and mutually contradictory
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positions emerge. The first, articulated most explicitly by
Walshe, is that the T.N.C., and the African National Congress
(A.N.C.) more generally, retained its conservative petty
bourgeois orientation and never effectively transcended its
class origins or effectively mobilised the political
constituency that the times had placed in its grasp. "While
unrest was widespread, if sporadic in expression," Walshe
argues, "agitation was difficult to maintain and Congress soon
lost the initiative against the authorities ... A determination
systematically to build up mass membership and branch organi-
sations so as to assert the power of the African majority
against European domination had not matured amongst a leader-
ship inclined to moral assertion and concerned with equality of
opportunity for progressive individuals. The tactics of
extra-constitutional opposition were not easily learnt by those
who still retained a vision of peaceful, perhaps spasmodic, but
inevitable political evolution." "It is clear", he goes on to
say, "from the general demeanour during these protests that
Congress remained under the leadership of men who still saw the
African's place as one of responsible citizenship11.11 Wickens,
more cautiously and with qualifications, takes Walshes cue.
Congress, though contributing through its meetings and
propoganda to the atmosphere in which the strikes were to flare
up and actively organising the 1919 anti-pass campaign, was
nevertheless small in membership, indecisive in leadership and
continually prone to constitutionalist initiatives, like the
Peace Delegation to Versailles in 1918.12
Simons and less explicitly Benson take a diametrically
opposite line. Criticising "the binary model of standard
Marxist theory" espoused by the International Socialist League
at the time, which denounced the A.N.C; as, "Labour Fakirs of
black South Africa, black bell-wethers for the capitalist
class", Simons suggests (somewhat obscurely) that African
nationalism was the authentic vehicle of black proletariat
aspirations, by virtue of its effective mobilisation of
agitation, and its identification with British imperial
capital against its more immediate white working class and
farming oppressors.13 Tracing an almost totally different
route Johnstone ends up in the same camp. Concentrating on
the functionality of the exploitation colour bars to imperial
capital, and the reactions of black workers to a steadily
deteriorating position, he equates Congress campaigns with
working class resistance, and treats African politics in this
period as a largely homogeneous movement.14
The purpose of this paper is to explore more sensitively and
in more detail the class dynamics of the black population on
the Rand between 1917 and 1922. Its main focus is the role
and activities of the black petty bourgeoisie, and to this
extent it takes off from Brian Willian's fascinating
exposition of the black petty bourgeoisie in Kimberley. As
Willan argues there, "Little scholarly analysis has been
devoted to an historical evolution of class difference amongst
Africans in twentieth century South Africa or to the
ideological forms that accompanied this", and he goes on to
explore the functionality of liberal ideology to the black
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petty bourgeoisie in Kimberley, and how De Beers deliberately
fostered an alliance with this group to forstall its radicali-
sation and identification with an increasingly militant black
working class.15 Willan's analysis raises questions which
will be taken up in this paper; it also neglects important
issues which have to be considered if we are to have a
satisfactory profile of the black petty bourgeoisie. Why, for
example, was it so susceptible to liberal ideology and co-
option from above? Of whom precisely did it consist? And to
what extent was it a homogeneous group? This study hopes to
take up these points in more detail, and does so by working
from three central premises. Firstly, that the petty
bourgeoisie as a class stands between the dominant relations of
production of capitalism, that is to say the capital/labour
relation, and as such is pulled two ways. Secondly, that,
the more separated is a social sector from the dominant
relations of production, and the more diffuse are its
'objective interests' and consequently, less developed
it 'class instinct1 - the more the evolution and the
resolution of the crisis will tend to take place on the
ideological level.16
And thirdly that the black petty bourgeoisie in a colonial
racist society was a fundamentally different creature from that
found in the developed capitalist world. As Godley noted in
his 1921 report on passes "a large majority of ^the/... members
/of the S.A.N.N.C.^ is comprised of natives who have acquired a
certain amount of education only to find the professional,
clerical and skilled avenues of employment closed to them...".17
The colonised black petty bourgeoisie was therefore both
stunted and repressed, and unable to articulate with conviction
its characteristic values of statology, the myth of. the ladder
and status quo anti-capitalism.18 In addition, for every one
of those admitted to its ranks, there was always a correspond-
ingly great substratum among the upper levels of the working
class - generally described at the time as the "educated" or
"civilised" - who aspired to their position but found their
upward mobility blocked. A downward identification towards
this group, at least by a section of stunted petty bourgeoisie,
was therefore always on the cards. How far this would proceed,
and the extent to which this class which was united only by
ideology and its intermediary position would cohere on this
issue, or split, would be determined by economic, political and
especially ideological class struggle. It is therefore to the
class struggle on the Rand and its co-ordinates in this period
that we must look for an answer to the questions we have posed.
ooOoo
In June 1917 the leadership of the A.N.C. shifted decisively
to the Rand. Seme and Dube were ousted and S.M. Maghatho and
S. Msane were elected respectivly President and Secretary
General. Walshe explains the realignment in terms of
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different tactics in response to the policy of segregation,
personality conflicts between Dube and Seme, and the remoteness
of Dube in Natal. Almost certainly the reasons went deeper
than that as Walshe himself recognises when he indicates that
much of the impetus for the purge came from the Transvalers and
those involved with the Johannesburg newspaper Abantu Batho.^
The Rand was now overwhelmingly the largest centre of black
urban population in South Africa, both of workers and the
incipient black petty bourgeoisie.
During the war industrial development had taken off, sucking
in huge numbers of those displaced from the land. Between
1915/16 and 1921/22 the number of industrial establishments on
the Rand increased from 862 to 1 763, while the black working
class engaged in non-mining activities (including "works")
swelled from 67 111 in 1918 to 92 597 in May 1920.20 Such an
environment provided the natural locus of political organisa-
tion, more especially as nearby Pretoria was the seat of
political power21, and it was to here that the centre of
gravity of black political organisation naturally moved.
Equally important in forcing the pace of this change was the
growth of the black petty bourgeoisie. As industry and the
black working class expanded so opportunities for the black
petty bourgeoisie opened up. Teachers and others with basic
educational qualifications flocked to try their luck in the
economic heartland of the Rand. Taberer for example, of the
Native Recruiting Corporation, reported that between 1915 arid
1918 he had received 2O5 written applications for clerkships on
the mines, mostly from Basutoland and the Cape, in addition to
two to three times that number of personal approaches, and
there seems little reason to believe the same pattern was not
repeating itself in industries all over the Rand.22 The size
which this community had reached by the end of the war is
difficult to judge. However, a rough and ready indication may
be provided by the number of registration certificates
(primarily granted to the self-employed) and letters of
exemption (accorded to those with over Standard 3 educational
qualifications) issued on the Rand. At the end of May 1920,
these, together with underage certificates stood at 2 497.23
How these broke down between the three categories is difficult
to judge, since only consolidated figures are furnished in the
1920 statement. A more detailed analysis for 1923 may however
provide some clues. According to this, those in possession of
juvenile certificates on the Rand amounted to 257 (191 domestic
servants, 66 golf caddies). Daily labourers - a substantial
number of whom must have possessed registration certificates -
totalled 1 001.24 This general profile is confirmed by Cooke
who in evidence to the Moffat Commission spoke of 1 078
Africans holding registration certificates in the proclaimed
labour district in 1917.25 A rough computation would therefore
suggest that the salaried or professional section of the black
petty bourgeoisie on the Rand numbered almost a thousand; and
the self-employed small businessmen or craftsman slightly over
that figure. It was these men who formed the organisational
core of the T.N.C. and it was to them that the mantle of
leadership now increasingly fell.
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1917 Was also important on the Rand for an additional reason.
In the middle of 1917 inflation began to bite (see Table I).
TABLE I
YEAR
tfDEX ON THE
(1938 = 100)
FOOD
97,7
94,3
99,2
104,3
113,3
115,7
124,9
163,9
133,9
109,9
105,8
108,3
108,3
107,1
WITWATERSRAND
ALL ITEMS
84,5
82,4
85,2
90,7
98,2
105,6
116,5
144,0
130,8
109,6
105,5
107,2
106,4
104,9
Prices of certain commodities had been rising since the
beginning of the war, but for a range of basic African consumer
goods, mine stores at least had expended old stocks at old
prices which only ran out in the middle of 1917. It seems
likely, given the dominance of mine and concession stores in
this sector of the market economy, that other traders followed
suit. The dammed up effects of inflation were therefore only
unleashed late in 1917.27 prices spiralled, and black wages,
unlike those of whites who received war bonuses and cost of
living allowances, remained relatively unchanged. The
political atmosphere on the Rand, and indeed in most other
urban areas in South Africa, became correspondingly charged.
In 1918 a boycott of mine stores was organised by Shangane
miners on the East Rand/ and in June 1918 Johannesburg's
sanitary workers struck in support of higher pay - an event,
which together with the harsh sentences handled down by
Magistrate McFie, galvanised migrant workers, industrial •
workers, urban lumpenproletariat and petty bourgeoisie into two
years of militant agitation beginning with the so-called
shilling strike of 1 July 1918.
The rise in prices and falling real incomes which followed
the war provided the trigger for the most radical black
agitation to be seen in South Africa prior to the Second World
War, and provoked a systematic rethinking of "native policy" in
the Union, and more particularly in the.urban areas of the Rand.
Yet it would be a serious mistake to exaggerate the importance
of this factor at the expense of the wider range of repressive
discriminatory mechanisms which bore on virtually the whole of
South Africa's black population at this time. The grievances
of mineworkers which eventually erupted in the 1920 black mine-
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workers strike have been explored in some detail by Johnstone
and also in my own article on the subject. What still
requires investigation is the structurally ultra-subordinate
position - to use Johnstonefs expression - of more permanent
urbanised workers and the black petty bourgeoisie.
Without wishing to do violence to the essential integrity of
the labour repressive system which governed the daily lives of
virtually all Africans on the Rand, five main areas of control
can be discerned - wages, passes, housing, constraints on
upward mobility and capital accumulation, and education. Each
is interrelated; each fell dxfferentially on different
sections of the African population. Yet while their
differential incidence provided scope for future reformist
initiatives, aimed at driving wedges between the black
population, their effects were sufficiently pervasive during
and immediately after the war to provide the basis for a broad
populist movement of agitation. It is to these that we shall
now turn.
The most burning grievance of the day for all classes in
society was that of wages. For the permanently proletarian-
ised it was just not possible to make ends meet at the prevail-
ing rates of pay. In 1921 the Johannesburg Joint Council of
Europeans and Natives calculated the essential expenses of a
family of four living at Klipspruit at £5.3.11 a four-week
month, excluding luxuries such as clothing, furniture and
entertainment.2® Adjusted for town dwellers average
expenditures would have been even higher, the increase in rent
exceeding the saving in travelling by from 5/- to 10/-, and the
same is probably true of areas of freehold tenure like
Sophiatown, Martindale and Newlands.29 If we extrapolate back
to 1917 on the basis of the retail price index this figure
could be depressed by perhaps 25% (prices of food having risen
by roughly 18% and those of all goods by about 33%), leaving us
with a minimum living wage of 84/6d, calculated on the basis of
a 4^ - week month. Very few African workers on the Rand earned
this sum of money. A survey of wages paid by private
employers in July 1914 for example shows the following
distribution30:
Under 60/- per month;
60/-
70/-
80/-
90/-
NOTE:
to
to
to
to
mostly with food and quarters:
2 559 employees (40 employers)
70/- per month; 70% without food and quarters:
2 859 employees (55 employers)
80/- per month; no food and quarters:
1 280 employees (33 employers)
90/- per month; no food and quarters:
691 employees (13 employers)
100/- per month; no food and quarters:
180 employees ( 4 employers)
The figures furnished are averages for industrial
establishments and so do not take account of,income
distribution within each industrial concern: . weekly figures
calculated on a 4-j week month.
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Little had changed by July 1918. Figures presented by
Cooke, Acting Director of Native Labour show the distribution
of wages outside the mining sector as follows31:
Category
Houseboys
Storeboys
Stable Boys
Municipal and Allied
Industrial Workers
% of Non-Mining
Working
Population
50%
23%
3%
9%
—
L
L
L
Average
40/-
70/-
without
60/-
50/-
and
15/-
to
Wages
60/-
to 80/-
quarters
to 70/-
with food
quarters
to
a
(calculated
week month
65/- to
: on a 4
month
60/-
22/6d
week
on 4-j
97/6d
week
to 90/-)
African testimony to Moffatt confirms this picture of
working class penury, and draws attention to the ommissions and
understatements of the Joint Council budget calculations.32
Perhaps the most common complaint expressed by African miners
and migrant labourers to the Moffat Commission was the rise in
cost of jackets and shoes and other items of clothing.33 If
these had entered into the realm of necessary as opposed to
discretionary expenditure for this section of the working
population, how much more essential must they have been to the
"educated" and "civilised" of the African petty and aspirant
petty bourgeoisie.
To exclude such items from the budgets of permanently
urbanised African families thus seems unreasonable and
arbitrary as do many of the other estimates of expenditure
contained in the Joint Council's budgetary forecasts.
Elias Chake, for example, estimated his outlays as: coal,
paraffin and wood at 10/-, 10/- and 5/- per month respectively,
church fee/school fees £10 and £8 a year, passes £3.5.0
annually and rent £2.10.0 a month, each of which were
appreciably higher than the Joint Council's 1921 assessment,
and the drift of evidence of other witnesses to Moffatt lends
substance to his claims. Of course, Chake as an interpreter
in the Magistrates Court in Pretoria, was quite clearly located
among the African petty bourgeoisie, yet like many others of
the African working class, he was living in a shack in a yard,
and his lifestyle and daily needs cannot have differed very
much from at least those of the aspirant African petty
bourgeoisie.34
The generalised poverty of the African working class is
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readily apparent, but it is more difficult to plot the income
and economic fortunes of the African petty bourgeoisie. The
most common wage for mine clerks, if one accepts the testimony
of R.W. Msimang, who seems to have held a special brief for
this group on the Moffatt Commission, was between £3 and £5,
with food and quarters added.35 Benajmin Phooko, who was one
of two mine clerks to appear before the Moffatt Commission, was
earning £3.15.0 a month, again with food and quarters added,
whcih thus confirms the payment of wages at the lower end of
Msimang1s bracket.36 More typical however were slightly
higher rates of pay. According to William Taberer, the
Director of the Native Recruiting Corporation, the average
payment to clerks in twelve mines chosen randomly, across all
the mining areas of the Rand was £4.7.6 a month, once more with
food and quarters included, and this we may perhaps take as a
more representative rate of pay.37 What other sections of the
petty bourgeoisie were earning is at the present stage of my
investigations a matter of speculation. Jeremiah Duljwa, head
teacher at the independent school in Klipspruit, which seems to
have attracted the children of the more affluent sections of
that community, earned £5 a month, which must serve, in the
absence of more detailed information, as a tentative indication
of the salaries commanded by his peers.38
If this is so, then one thing emerges very starkly from
these figures, and that is the small differential between the
wages of the black petty bourgeoisie and the rest of the black
working class. As we have seen, wages in the non-mining
sectors ranged from 65/- to 97/6d, while even underground work
in the mines themselves was commanding an average of £3.5.2 per
30 day shift.39 The objective conditions for an alliance of
convenience centred on the demand of 1/- a day therefore
clearly existed, and renders intelligible the universal support
accorded to this demand in 1918 and 1919.
At the same time the lines of potential cleavage within this
alliance should not be ignored. Most obvious perhaps were
those which existed between teachers or others who held good
educational qualifications, who "came to the Rand thinking they
would get better work" and found that as mine clerks they were
"only getting the same as received by a blanket man under-
ground", from whom they strove to set themselves apart. 4Q
Less striking, but nonetheless important,, was a more blurred
line of demarcation between those who thought of themselves
as educated and" civilised and.those they deemed were.not. A
refrain that runs through the evidence to the Moffatt
Commission is the needs of this rather amorphous group on the
Rand. As Msimang put it:
Many Europeans do not understand these people. They
do not understand that he lives at a fairly high
standard of living. These people need - in fact
they require - all the things practically required by
the European. Take the food bill. Most Europeans
seem to think these people are content with porridge,
but you will find they have quite a representative
table. Meat, tea and so on.41
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Elias Chake, court interpreter, testified in similar terms.
It was not true, he insisted, that blacks had few requirements.
No consideration was paid to the educated who had different
tastes and different needs. It was time for some differentia-
tion of treatment, he seemed to be saying, between those who
were educated and civilised and those who had yet to reach that
stage.42 I. Bud Mbelle, ex-interpreter from the High Court in
Kimberley echoed Chake's views, while the Reverend Mcayiya went
as far as to offer some practical suggestions, intimating that
the salaries of "civilised natives" should be considered
separately from those of others by boards of arbitration
comprised of representatives of both sides.43
The message that is conveyed in these representations is one
of a perceived community of interest between the black petty
and aspirant petty bourgeoisie. In part this was the product
of what Laclau would call their "interpellation" as "educated"
or "civilised", that is to say their mode of self-
identification on an ideological plane.44 The possibilities
this presented for straight ideological co-option have already
been mentioned, but there was more to their community of
interest than mere ideological forms. Many, though by no
means all of this "community" were permanent urban dwellers who
were struggling against the odds to raise their families in
town. This meant that their total costs of reproduction had
to be covered by incomes generated in the cities, which in the
case of urban workers simply did not stretch that far. Power-
ful pressures therefore existed for their wives to go out to
work, which seems to have been as true of all but the most
affluent sections of the petty bourgeoisie as it was of those
who aspired to join their ranks.
This particular conjuncture of circumstances both served to
cohere the petty and aspirant petty bourgeoisie, and paradoxi-
cally to drive them closer together with the rank and file of
the working class. As Debbie Gaitskell has shown two broad
categories of women came to be settled in the towns. Firstly,
those coming unattached or fleeing from their homes, who
became domestic servants, washer women or prostitutes, or took
up illicit liquor selling to earn an income. Secondly, the
wives and daughters of families of those who came to settle
permanently in town. Perhaps the most striking characteristic
of this group was their relatively high literacy levels, 4,71%
of Transvaal women from the country being literate as opposed
to 31% of their urban kin.45 It seems likely that the
majority of the latter provided spouses for the urban petty and
aspirant petty bourgeoisie, thereby serving to cohere it even
further around the values of education and civilisation, yet
their openings for employment were almost as limited as those
of the urban unattached. Opportunities for domestic service
were limited, besides separating them from their families and
homes, and wages had in any case been depressed between 5/- and
10/- at the beginning of the war.46 Washing was back-breaking
and low-paying47, and for the women of Klipspruit location,
involved travelling costs which virtually cancelled out any
profits to be made. As Charlotte Maxexe and Rev. Mcayiya
complained to the Moffatt Commission, echoing the plea of 122
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Klipspruit women uttered eight years before, "much of the work
formerly done by women in now taken over by men".48
The only alternative in these circumstances was the illicit
brewing of liquor, which automatically thrust them back into
the arms of their lumpen and proletarian brethren in the
locations and in the towns. William Letlalo, for example,
recalls how his wife was forced into illicity liquor brewing to
provide funds to send his children to school - Letlalo was at
that time a Transvaal Native Congress member and a storeman,
and thus a member, in my argument, of the aspirant petty
bourgeoisie - and the number of complaints to official bodies
and government commissions from members of the petty
bourgeoisie about police raids for liquor seem to indicate this
was an important occupation of this class.49 Once again, then,
we find arising in the particular conjuncture of the war-time
economy two contradictory trends. On the one hand, the
cohering of the urban petty and aspirant petty bourgeoisie: on
the other, the possibilities of mobilising a broad class
alliance comprising the proletariat, lumpenproletariat and
petty bourgeoisie. Only the day-to-day flux of the class
struggle, and the respective pressures and inducements offered
by the main protagonists in the conflict - capital and labour -
would determine the eventual position of the petty bourgeoisie.
If the black petty bourgeoisie and working class were thrust
together on the issues of wages and cost of living, they found
themselves in equally close proximity in relation to housing
and passes. Both issues occupied a central place in their
representations to official commissions and government bodies,
and were central planks in their campaigns of 1918-1920.
Passes were perhaps the most bitter source of grievance, and by
their multi-functional nature afflicted and hence united all
sections of the black urban population. For the labourer in
wage employ they represented the means whereby his contract of
employment was attested, and could be enforced, and his
opportunity to seek new employment or improved conditions
effectively curtailed. A sense of this repressive function of
the pass law was no doubt present in the minds of black workers
from the earliest days of the system, but it only emerged fully
blown in the consciousness of the black petty bourgeoisie with
the sanitary workers strike on the Rand in April 1918.
Sentenced to three months hard labour on the jobs they had
previously performed, for presuming to strike for higher wages,
the "bucket boys1" helplessness before the interlocking
mechanisms of Pass Laws and Masters and Servants legislation
stripped bare for all to see the labour repressive functions of
the law. As Benjamin Phooko, a clerk representing 5 000 City
Deep labourers protested:
Allowing prices to rise alarms us because we have
entered into contracts that cannot be broken, so as
to demand a-higher price for our labour. We-there-
fore record our sympathy;with the Municipal workers
who were-forced to break, their contracts.50
Nine months later the same point was driven home in a
pamphlet issued by the Transvaal Native Congress. "At our
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meeting at Vrededorp on 30.3.19", it bluntly proclaimed, "we
came to the conclusion that passes prevented money."51
Passes did indeed prevent money, and in a variety of more
subtle and disguised ways. On the monthly pass, renewed each
month by the employer, workers1 wages were recorded, and this
served to peg them indefinitely at low levels, since new
employers could always see what wages had been paid before.
Any upward drift that might have been effected by withholding
of labour and holding out for higher pay was further inhibited
by the 6-day pass which obliged the worker to find new employ-
ment within six days; the travelling pass which required the
payment of a shilling before the worker was allowed to seek
employment outside of the district of his registration; and
the 'special', which strictly interpreted needed to be carried
by the worker when he left his employer's premises.52
Government spokesmen stoutly defended the even-handedness of
these measures. The justification furnished by Herbert Cooke,
Acting DNC, in an open letter to "the natives of the
Witwatersrand" at the height of the anti-pass law agitation, is
fairly typical in this respect:
In Johannesburg and other reef towns unless the
natives name and place of residence is written on his
pass he is lost to his people. Messages cannot be
sent to him. If he dies no-one knows where his
money is to be sent. If he does not get money
written in his pass he can complain to the pass
officer.53
Cooke's argument was reproduced in several official
submissions to the Inter-Departmental Pass Laws Committee in
1920, but the essential hypochrisy of at least the last part of
his argument was exposed by the Inspector (Central) NAD,
Johannesburg. "The existing regulations regarding the non-
payment of wages", he said,
do not sufficiently protect the natives. Under the
Pass Regulations the intent to defraud has to be
proved which in most cases is impossible. The
Masters and Servants Act only protects servants to a
slight degree, the penalty provided being insuffi-^
cient to deter employers from defrauding their
natives.54
The real thrust of the Pass Laws was to enforce contracts
and prevent desertion (their role in checking criminality is
discussed later in the paper), and this emerges quite clearly
from a discussion of Night Passes by W.C. Lawrence, Acting
Chief Pass Officer of the Rand. Night passes were required by
anyone who wished to be out after 9.00 p.m. in a municipal area,
and their application had been extended to black women shortly
before the war. This proved a fertile source of complaint
from the African petty bourgeoisie in particular, since it
exposed women to the uncouth attentions of police alledgedly in
pursuance of their duty.55 Lawrence's opposition to any
relaxation of this measure brings into focus the essential
functions of the system as a whole. Women, he argued, since
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they were not obliged to carry the ordinary array of passes,
were virtually free of control. "There is the Masters and
Servants Act", he went on to say,
but it is very difficult indeed to trace women. They
simply disappear in the night ... under the Night Pass
Ordinance_she is frightened to go out without her pass
and you ^presumably the employer and the authorities?
are not so liable to lose her.56
R.M. Tladi's passionate denunciation of the system to the
Superintendent of Native Affairs at Benoni underlines the
point:
(1) A Passport is supposed to be a protection to
natives and regarded as an agreement made at
the Pass Office between the employer and the
employee.
Question:
(1) (a) If so why should I be compelled to
carry this agreement or document with
me?
(2) (b) Why should the Police run after me
day and night asking me to produce
this document and cause me to be
absolutely restless?
(3) (c) Why can't I place it in my box for
safety?
(4) (d) Why if I happen to have this in my
house the Police must arrest me, and
that I have to suffer the penalty
before any dispute arises between
myself and my employer? __
The same solicitude for the. welfare of the employee was
reflected in the official glosses placed.on the operation of
the six-day and travelling passes. Very few unemployed were
prosecuted, Cooke argued in evidence to the Moffatt Commission,
unless they had been out of work for one, two or three months
consecutively. W.C. Lawrence, Chief Pass Officer, took a
slightly more cautious line. The six-day pass, he testified,
was usually extended for an extra six days, and for blacks on
subsequent registration, for up.to fifteen days. As for the
'special1, both denied that in practice this regulation was
applied to anyone but a mine labourer in the district of
registration.5 8 & mass of testimony contradicts this inter-
pretation. As R.M. Tladi, a TNC official from Benoni,
protested, the six-day slip meant that a man earning 2/- per
day tried to find work at higher pay but had to settle for
l/6d through the expiry of the pass which included Sundays, and
the Pass Officer's refusal to extend for any more than three
days further, including the day of issue.59 And a variety of
other supported his claim.60
Indirect support may even be adduced from the Inter-
Departmental Pass Laws Committee submissions. Holidays and
Sundays, the NAD Inspector Benoni argued, should not be
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included in the six days stipulated to get work, which suggests
that at a local level at any rate, the pass laws were adminis-
tered more rigorously than Cooke or Lawrence allowed.61
This leads us to the question of the actual administration
and policing of pass laws, but before moving on to that we
should consider two last aspects of passes which served to
maintain a submissive and servile workforce for employers in
town. These were the character column on passes and the
endorsement of the stamp FIRD for anyone convicted of a
criminal offence. The way in which the character column on
passes served to suppress employee unrest or resistance has
been mentioned by van Onselen, and is graphically illustrated
by H.S. Mgqamo's speech to the Superintendent, Native Affairs,
Benoni:
A native works under a white man for 5 years or more.
He by mere misfortune breaks a glass or any article
in the house. His master gets annoyed and forgets
this man worked for such a long time under him. He
discharges him and on his character he writes 'bad
boy1. This character disables the man to obtain
work anywhere and in some cases even if engaged by
another white man, when registering him at the Pass
Office seeing his character on the Pass the Pass
Officer turns to the employer and states "I advise
you not to take this boy", then the man is stranded.
Mgqamo then went on to trace this hypothetical individual's
descent into depravity - he meets a 'white hooligan1 who gets
him a forged pass in turn for selling liquor: he is arrested
and convicted, and on discharge has the hated words FIRD
imprinted in his passport. He is now of necessity condemned
to a life of permanent criminality from which he will never
escape.62
The connection between criminality and the pass laws was
indeed intimate, and is worthy of special consideration. An
enduring concern of the urban authorities was the canker of
criminality in the black community on the Rand, and the threat
that this volatile constituency could constitute (particularly
if allied to poor white lumpen slum dwellers) in times of hard-
ship and political instability.63 The pass laws were the
principal means of policing and if possible of rooting out this
'evil', since by definition the unemployed could not possess a
pass stamped with the appropriate contract of employment,
unless, of course, this was obtained by extra legal means.
This in practice was what often happened, and so the pass laws
were often leaky in respect of this particularly crucial
function. Nevertheless, to the extent that they obliged
recourse to such expedients, with the various costs which they
necessarily entailed, they were as unpopular with the lumpen-
proletariat as they were with the African working class. It
was for this reason that they came to constitute a key
component of the anti-pass agitation and infused the movement
with much of the volatility and violence that it came to
possess.64
This criminal function of the pass laws was not limited to
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policing the lumpenproletariat, but also spilled over and
infected their application to the black populace as a whole.
"The Pass Laws as applied in the -Labour districts", commented
the Native Affairs Inspector for Krugersdorp,
appear to be based on the assumption that every native
is a criminal from whom the rest of the community has
to be protected, hence the introduction of the Finger
Impression system.
And it was,
the continual harrassment by police and others, often
in an officious manner demanding the production of
passes at all times and places,
which he felt was probably at the root of the grievances of the
pass law system as a whole.65
Other evidence confirms at least the earlier part of his
assessment,
There is without a doubt unsumpathetic treatment of
natives by police constables and junior officials in
Government Departments,
argued the Inspector of the NAD, Benoni, and representatives of
the petty bourgeoisie were among the most vociferous in
confirming his charge. "The pass", T.M. Tladi protested
persecutes and disappoints /you7 ... In the first
place when you meet a Policeman you'll have to take
off your hat and then produce your pass otherwise you
will be knocked about and afterall you will be
arrested and charged for resisting or failing to
satisfy the Police and you will be convicted accord-
ingly.66
Others endorsed Tladifs views - Mvabasa spoke of "deficient
policemen who do not know the nature of the charges"67, while
'Comrade Sebeho1 at a meeting of the Industrial Workers of
Africa (IWA), during the 1/- a day agitation, gave some clue as
to why those adopting 'civilised' manners might be more open to
harrassment and victimisation. "The whites are wise", Sebeho
pointed out, "they do not appoint natives born in town to the
police, only those from the kraals", which may be legitimately
construed as confirming van Onselen's argument about the
divisive objectives of this pattern of recruitment.68
To sum up then, passes clearly 'prevented money1, whether of
a legal or extra-legal variety; they also delivered a !>
submissive, vulnerable workforce, which would not lightly run
the risk of crossing the wishes of their masters. It is
hardly surprising that they became the focus of militant <
agitation on the Rand, in March and April 1919. Yet while
oppressing all sections of the African community, and providing
a focus of cross-class opposition, they did not oppress all
black urban dwellers in the same way, and thus simultaneously
furnished a means of fragmenting and defusing the agitation to
which they had given birth. The irreducible core of the pass
laws was maintaining a politically stable low wage economy by
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enforcing contracts and inhibiting mobility, and by policing
and rooting out the criminal lumpenproletarian mob. This was
a point on which virtually all submissions by officials to the
Inter-Departmental Pass Laws Committee agreed (for example,
"I do not think the Native suffers any hardship under the
existing regulations as to registering contracts. The
contract protects him as much as it does the employer",
Manager G.N.L. B. Compound; "The Pass Laws in_other Provinces
do not appear to be satisfactorily effective ^which has7 led to
grievances against restrictions under the Transvaal Pass Laws,
but it is undoubtedly necessary for the protection, not only of
the employer, but of the native himself". Inspector NAD, Benoni;
"These people are in various stages of development but the raw
or blanket native predominates and with these people there is
neither a sense of responsibility or self-control, and I cannot
conceive of any modification of the provisions of the law as
affecting this particular class being brought in without
involving grave consequences, having regard to the many
temptations - such as illicit liquor traffic, with which
natives residing on the Rand are beset". Protector of Natives;
"It is not thought that the existing pass laws in the Transvaal
Province could be revised, modified, or simplified to any
extent ... as during the recent anti-pass agitation the only
specific reason given by the natives ... was that the carrying
of the pass curtailed their actions". Pass Officer, NAD,
Roodepoort; "The Transvaal law has been thoroughly tested and
has proved simple in administration as also fair and to work
smoothly. With the exception of a few slight provisions ...
/ng7... grounds for modification". Pass Officer, Boksburg;
".7. the Pass Laws of this Province ... need but little
revision as far as the ordinary native is concerned. The
native, or any subject race for that matter, will always
agitate for a law which places less restraint on his movements".
Pass Officer, Randfontein. (See also footnotes 53 and 69.)
Equally striking however was one other area of unanimity,
and this was in respect of relaxing the regulations governing
the granting of exemptions and certificates of registration.
The recommendations put forward here are particularly interest-
ing since they may help us to define a little more closely the
amorphous group described until now as the aspirant petty
bourgeoisie. The potential beneficiaries of this largesse,
where specified, were store boys; bank messengers of long
service; "the respectable educated and partly educated"; the
skilled artisan, mechanic, tradesman, clerks and skilled
hospital attendants - which is perhaps as close as we will get
to delineating this rather impalpable group.70
To fully mollify these elements, reforms in the policing of
passes and the abolition of the E1 fee for registration, (both
of which were recommended in the evidence) would have had to
have been undertaken, yet even without them such a policy
carried the germ of success. Registration and exemption
certificates freed their holders from the normal operation of
the pass laws, from the night curfew and from 'native1 taxation
- -all of which were major grievances of the urban populace at
the time. They also virtually automatically entitled the
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possessor to higher rates of remuneration, since the pass could
not now fulfill its customary wage pegging function, and since
exemption was taken as an index of potential for a higher
calibre of work.71 Like the agitation on wages therefore, the
agitation on passes was a double edged weapon since its central
target could as it were be dismantled and used to disorganise
the alliance it had spawned.
"The Pass Law is ... slavery,"72 Housing ran close second
for the prize of the most hated single institution governing
black urban life on the Rand. Conditions were truly appalling,
Existing accommodation fell into five distinct categories: in
townships like Klipspruit which served Johannesburg, or others
like the Blue Sky location which were dormitories for other
towns along the Rand; in areas of freehold occupation like
Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare or Alexandra; in the urban
slums of Vrededorp and the Malay location, Fordsburg,
Doornfontein, Ferreirastown, Jeppestown, Marshalltown and
Prospect Township, where rooms in yards could be hired; on the
premises of employers or in compounds they built to house their
employees; and in barrack-like compound accommodation such as
that at Jubilee and Salisbury which the municipal councils
built to accommodate their own and other private businesses1
employees.7
Material conditions were uniformly squalid and depressed.
Klipspruit, Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and Germiston and
a number of other east Rand locations were built immediately
adjacent to municipal sewage depositing sites, which was the
principal reason for them becoming available for African
occupation. Klipspruit was the worst. By 1917 it was
virtually surrounded by the sewage farm, with many huts being
within 300 yards of its perimeter.74 Most families lived in
the municipality built V-shaped huts, which were "no more than
an iron roof placed over the floor"7^; virtually no facilities
were provided'6; the mortality rate was staggering (20:100
adults in 1914/15 and 380:1 000 infantile mortality)77; and
the transport cost of the ten mile journey to Johannesburg bit
deeply into the earnings of those who had to work in town
(sixpence daily return, 2/6d weekly and 8/6d monthly).78 In
addition, residents were subjected to a highly autocratic
location administration. One of the principal inducements
held out for moving to Klipspruit in 1906 was the availability
of mealie plots and grazing for those who hired stands, but by
1910 most grazing had been fenced off, the owners of strayed
cattle being fined at a rate of 5/- or 10/- a head, and the
area available for cultivation had been drastically reduced.79
Arbitrary actions of all kinds were a regular feature of
location life. Raids for the brewing of illegal liquor; the
auctioning of owner-built accommodation valued at anything up
to £100, when the occupier had fallen into arrears on stand
rent, which were then auctioned to the municipality for
ludicrous sums (for example 7/6d, E1.1O.O), and re-let at.
rentals from between £1-£2 a month; a 2/6d charge to ride a
bicycle and so on.80 Other locations along the Rand endured
equally austere and insensitive regimes. - Rents were often
higher, even less municipal housing was provided, facilities
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were miniscule and the came continual harrassment took place.81
Small wonder that "the better class of educated and skilled
native dislike fdj the name 'location1 ^and7 compared them with
compounds".82 The functions and objectives were in essence
the same. Conditions were little better in the freehold areas
of Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare, etc. Prices of property
were two to five times higher than those in neighbouring white
suburbs; facilities were non-existent; overcrowding was rife;
and diseases endemic. And while they were located consider-
ably nearer town, no municipal transport was provided.83
It comes as some surprise therefore to learn that there were
long waiting lists for accommodation in each of these
locations.8^ A brief review of the housing ecology of the
Rand helps suggest some of the reasons. The massive increase
in the Witwatersrand black urban population, as a result of the
structural transformations engendered by the war had created a
tremendous demand for African accommodation, which the building
industry had conspicuously failed to satisfy. Costs of
building materials which had soared during the war provide part
of the answer, but much more crucial was the inability or
unwillingness of the municipal authorities charged with the
responsibility for black housing, to undertake the necessary
programme of relief.85 The constraints under which the
municipal authorities laboured have been treated extensively by
Kagan and Proctor, and will not be examined in any detail here.
Suffice it to say that white rate-payer opposition; commercial
and speculative interests who profited from the high rentals
yielded by the slums or looked for windfall gains on sale of
land to the municipality; the reluctance of mining companies
to part with the surface rights to their land; and the over-
lapping jurisdictions of municipal, provincial and central
authorities, all served to paralyse any action in this field.86
There were, as a result, at least 10 000 blacks in Johannesburg
alone without authorised accommodation in municipal compounds,
locations or black freehold areas.87 Their needs were met -
though hardly satisfactorily - by a municpal permit system
which allowed employers to house employees on their premises,
in small employer constructed compounds, or in rooms hired in
adjacent multi-racial slums.88 Each - and certainly the last
- was less satisfactory than accommodation provided in
locations and hence helps further explain why such urban
dwellers were so anxious to move out. On the premises of
employers heavy rentals were often charged, leading to over-
crowding89; in compounds, there was no provision for families
to stay; and the slums were characterised by the most degrad-
ing conditions to be found anywhere on the Rand. Tenants were
housed in unsanitary yards, divided up into numerous tiny rooms;
they lived cheek by jowl with criminals, prostitutes and other
lumpenproletariat elements; rents were extortionate, usually
averaging 25/- to 30/- per month for a room; disease was rife
(these areas usually being the source of epidemics that
periodically ravaged the Rand); and infant mortality rates
were higher than anywhere else (355,18:1 000 in 1919-1020).90
The collective grievance over housing was thus one which
could mobilise virtually all sections of the African community.
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At the same time it should also be recognised that it was felt
most keenly by the same "educated" and "civilised" who were
struggling to construct a tolerable family life in the towns.
Jammed together in disease-ridden hovels with the lowest strata
of black society, they were the most anxious to escape to the
dubious advantages of the location. To the extent then that
the authorities could provide housing for this sector and
introduce a few elementary reforms in the running of the
locations, these people were open to being detached from the
radical populist alliance that emerged in 1918-1919. The
authorities themselves were not slow to take the point.
Disease, and the influenza epidemic were jeopardising the
reproduction of the more permanently urbanised population on
the Rand91; shortage of housing was breeding intense disaffec-
tion both in the locations and the volatile urban slums. As
Major Cooke observed in discussions with the Parks and Estates
Committee:
The Committee is perfectly aware the period has been
marked by a considerable amount of industrial unrest,
and that no longer did the native take up that docile
attitude which he had done in the past. This is a
result of education which has been instilled in him,
and will be found even more apparent, with the result
that we must look for more increased difficulties and
we must be more careful than in the past ... the time
was by no means inopportune for reviewing the
procedure regarding native administration ^and in
particular/ housing.92
H.S. Bell, Native Sub-Commissioner, embroidered on the theme.
After commenting on the unsympathetic treatment meted out to
"the better class of educated and skilled", he went on to say:
There are the educated and skilled native labourers,
many of whom are of decent class and desire to live
decently, and many young men and women growing up of
the same class, who have nowhere to go for any sort
of recreation after their daily labours,, nowhere
where they can go in the evenings ... it is surely :
the duty of the Public to assist them to become
respectable, and try and alienate them from the
illicit liquor evils and other evils to which so
many are driven ... As far as I know there is
absolutely nothing being done to meet' the require-
ments of this class, who claim to be the leaders of
the natives and some grow into bitter agitators.93
The Government was not slow in grasping the nettle (although
it should be noted that its grip quickly slackened when the
urban agitation died down after 1921), In September 1918,
Louis Botha urged the Administrator of the Transvaal that the
housing question should be taken up urgently with the local
authorities. "The present state of affairs" he emphasised was,
"not only a grave menace to public health, but in addition the
social and moral evils accruing from the indiscriminate herding
together of Europeans and natives in slum quarters in
The Transvaal Native Congress 1917-2920 19
Johannesburg are incalculable".94 Shortly afterwards, in 1919,
the Public Health Act was passed, empowering local authorities
to prevent or remedy unhealthy housing conditions, and this was
followed in 1920 by the Housing Act which authorised the
central government to assist local authorities in preparing
housing schemes and which allowed them to raise loans either
privately or from government sources.95 Clearly the needs of
"the better class of educated and skilled" were finally
receiving some attention, which may provide one part of the
explanation of why the urban militancy on the Rand flickered
out in 1921.
Thus far in this paper the black petty bourgeoisie have been
treated as a relatively homogeneous group. This they clearly
were not. In common with the same class in other parts of the
capitalist world they can be divided roughly between the small
business owners/petty commodity producers, and professionals
and the salariat, although there were those who straddled the
divide. One thing that united both strata of this class
however (or both classes as some would have it) were the tight
limits placed on their capacity for capital accumulation. To
both, this was what was signified by the ubiquitous "colour
bar". Most areas of government service were closed to blacks;
private enterprise enforced its own "customary colour bar";
blacks were not allowed to own businesses or black eating
houses in white areas, and the pressures of white labour and
segregationist ideology had forced many of the marginal but
fairly successful purveyors of services out into the economic
wilderness of the townships, or back into the working class.96
Even in black residential areas a number of other constraints
were felt. In Klipspruit, where the purchase of land was
prohibited, no-one could lease more than one stand or one
mealie plot, and licences for trading and petty vending were
both discriminatory and prohibitive.97 In 1910 business
stands cost 36/- a month as opposed to 7/6d in Vrededorp (by
the end of the war they had risen to 38/-); and trolleys for
hawkers were licenced at £3 each98 (this of course was in
addition to the 2/- payment for a monthly pass).99 Even then
black businessmen did not necessarily enjoy a monopoly of the
trade. Some locations, according to Bell, the Native Sub-
Commissioner of the Witwatersrand, were monopolised by
European traders, and Kagan gives examples of such intrusions
into Alexandra and Klipspruit.100 In the freehold areas the
situation was in many respects worse. Properties in
Sohpiatown cost two to five times the going price in neighbour-
ing white areas, and were beyond the reach of most of the
African petty bourgeoisie, while trading was dominated by
"coolies and foreigners".101 Perhaps the clearest evidence of
the slender resources of the African petty bourgeoisie however
is the small number that could even afford to.build their own
houses under leasehold arrangements in places like Klipspruit,
and the frequency with which those that were built were
auctioned to cover arrears of stand rent.102
The African traditional petty bourgeoisie (small-scale
business owners and petty vendors) were clearly a highly
marginalised group- Some indication of this is given by a
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return of daily labourers for Johannesburg in 1923 (see Table
II).
TABLE II
DAILY LABOURERS - JOHANNESBURG 1923104
Nature of Employment Number
Shoemakers and Cobblers 198
Tailors and Clothes-Menders 83
Clothes Cleaners 15
Pedlars and Hawkers 387
Carpenters 21
Tinkers and Plumbers 36
Trolley Drivers and Dray Carters 34
General Dealers 57
Wash Boys 29
Brickmakers and Builders 25
Paperhangers and Painters 19
Ornament Makers 14
Butchers 10
Miscellaneous 73
Bootblacks, Musicians, Quarrymen,
Coal Heavers, Hedge Trimmers,
Hairdressers, Bakers, Bicycle
Mechanics, Well Sinkers, Insurance
Canvassers, Wagon Makers, Thatchers,
Jobbing Gardeners, Evangelists,
Ourse Makers, Grass Mowers, Eating-
House Keepers, Bangle Makers,
Mattress Makers, Blacksmiths,
Harness Stitchers, Sock and Cap
Knitters, Laundrymen
TOTAL 1 001
Possibilities for capital accumulation were clearly small, at
least in the lower and middle ranges of the spectrum, and it
was for this reason that many chose to enter, the salariat, and
use this as a springboard into more substantial entrepreneurial
ventures. S.M. Maghatho and C.S. Mabaso of the TNC apparently
chose this route, as did Josiah Sibiya, Klipspruit's most
successful business 'tycoon'. *03
It is hardly surprising in this circumstances that the
professionals and the salariat came to be viewed as the most
prestigious section of the petty bourgeoisie, and the principal
reference group for those aspiring to its ranks. By the same
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token, education and being educated became entrenched as a
central value and aspiration in the consciousness of the black
petty and aspirant petty bourgeoisie. "During the past half
dozen years", wrote M.C. Brice, the Honorary Secretary of
Native Girls Industrial School Committee,
The kaffir has been educating himself in his little
tin shack in our back yards to a degree that might
astonish the average Johannesburger to think about.105
Education thus became the principal means to breach to citadel
of white privilege, the key element in the self-identification
of the petty and aspirant petty bourgeoisie and a major demand
in the agitations which arose in 1918-1920.
ooOoo
The method of native organisation either political or
industrial organisation must of necessity be the
reverse of methods adopted by more established
communities ... The incentive to organise come from
the top rather than the bottom. Leaders of native
people are largely self constituted instead of being
elected by well established bodies. „
 p v 106
It is striking that prior to.the sanitary workers' demand
for higher pay in June 1918 there is scarcely a hint of the
impending radicalisation of the black petty bourgeoisie. The
most militant posture struck was a threat of a strike in
response to the Native Administration Bill of 1917, uttered at
an ANC meeting at Phokeng, and this seems to have been little
more than a rhetorical flourish which came to nothing in the
end.107 Even the East Rand boycott of mine stores in February
1918, which was recognised retrospectively by the leaders of
Congress as the beginning of the agitation, elicited scarcely
an expression of concern, and certainly no involvement, from
the leaders of the petty bourgeoisie.108 AS I. Bud Mbelle
said in answer to a question about the stores boycott addressed
to him by the Moffatt Commission, "We /the TNC7 did not know
/what led to it7 - • • we were waiting for people to come and
explain to us." No people did".109 As late as March and May
1918 no single reference was made to the need for higher wages
at the SANNC and TNC Congress .meetings held at Bethlehem and
Pietersburg on 29 March and 24 May respectively.110 The
Congress leaders can hardly have been accused of having their
finger on the pulse of the working class. Only with the
bucket boys strike, which provided the first visible expression
of a broader groundswell of opposition among the industrial
working class, was the Congress leadership finally stung into
action.
At the outset of this paper I argued that the petty
bourgeoisie, lying between the two dominant relations of
production, tended to swing according to the pressures
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exercised on it by the two contending classes. Laclau
develops this point specifically with regard to ideological
class struggle.
In periods of stability, when the social formation
tends to reproduce its relations following tradit-
ional channels and succeeds in neutralising its
contradictions by displacements, this is when the
dominant bloc in the formation is able to absolve
most of the contradictions and its ideological
discourse tends to rest more on purely implicit
mechanisms of its unity. This is when generally,
the correlation between the logical consistency of
the elements of the discourse and its ideological
unity reaches its lowest point (religious inter-
pellations of an ascetic type can, for example, co-
exist with an increased enjoyment of worldly goods
without the social agents 'living1 them as
incompatible) .
In a period of generalised ideological crisis .. . the
opposite tends to occur. The crisis of confidence
in the •natural1 or 'automatic1 reproduction of the
system is translated into an exacerbation of all the
ideological contradictions and into a dissolution of
the unity of the dominant ideological discourse. As
the function of all ideology is to constitute
individuals as subjects, this ideological crisis is
necessarily translated into an 'identity crisis' of
social agents. Each one of the sectors in struggle
will try and reconstitute a new ideological unity
using a 'system of narration1 as a vehicle which
disarticulates the ideological discourses of the
opposing forces.111
The events of 1918-1920, in my view, bear out these proposi-
tions. The ideology of one wing of the petty bourgeoisie was
clearly disarticulated and re-articulated to that of the
working class. A middle section vacillated continually and
experienced an identity crisis in response to the contradictory
pulls of capital, state and the black working class, and the
more established affluent and reactionary section sustained,
with occasional deviations, an ideology articulated with that
of the ruling class.
The speed with which substantial sectors of the petty
bourgeoisie swung in mid 1918 in clear evidence of the
precarious ideological hegemony exercised by the ruling classes
over a racially repressed petty bourgeoisie in a colonial
situation. It. is also testimony to the depth of working class
resentment that had built up in the course of the war.
According to Fennas Plaatjes of Randfontein Block, this was a
complaint that went back to 1917 (i.e. when inflation began to
bite).112 Benjamin Phooko of City Deep put the issue in a
little more perspective. Workers had wanted an increase even
before the war but now the demand had intensified. Individual
workers had been asking for an increase for some time. It was
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in fact an everyday occurance.113 What prompted the move to
collective action is a more complex question. A major
precipitating factor however was the Municipal Engineers Strike
of 11-14 May 1918, which put out the town's lights for five
nights. The speed with which the municipality caved in and a
23% increase was awarded to all white.municipal workers as
a result of their action was no doubt an object lesson to
all black workers on the Rand.114 Indeed it is worth noting
that all the major strike movements on the Rand in this period
coincided with actual or impending white worker action. In
1913, it was the white mine workers strike115; in 1918 the
Engineers strike; in April 1919 (the time of the anti-pass
agitation) a building strike together with a ballot for a
general strike116; and in February 1920 a ballot for another
white mineworkers strike. In part the synchronism no doubt
arose from the 'demonstration1 or 'infection1 effects which
have been noted by other commentators117, but equally important
in all probability was a sense of weakening or rupture in the
power bloc, which black workers felt they would be able to
exploit. Certainly the repressive capacities of the state
were stretched to their limit on these occasions.1*8
Whatever the precise interplay of these factors the black
workers employed on the mechanical section of the S.A.R. soon
got the message. On 13 May - right in the middle of the
Engineers strike - they also demanded and secured an increase
of 3d a day.119 The success of the railways worker's action
had a ripple effect across the Rand. "This constitutional
/method7 reported the Town Inspector of the NAD, "has evidently
been copied by the Municipal natives" . On 20 May one hundred
workers at the Destructor Compound, Newtown followed suit, and
a few days later similar requests were made in nearly all the
other municipal compounds. In the latter case there seemed,
in the view of the same official, to have been "more concerted
action". "This would appear to indicate", he concluded,
"that correspondence and organisation is being evolved among
the natives employed in large concerns.120
The Council's reply was that they would consider the matter
at their next committee meeting and on 1 June their answer was
delivered to the workers at Vrededorp. No increase would be
granted; contracts would have to be worked out and workers
would then be free to leave or disengage. Those re-engaging
would then be considered for a small increment.11 The
workers expressed disappointment but appeared to acceed, and
the Town Inspector departed completely oblivious of the trouble
that was about to erupt. As workers reflected on the decision
their anger evidently deepened. They were among the worst
paid workers on the Rand, earning E2.1O.O a month for a seven
day week; they were contracted for 180 days (the sanitary
section at least); their work was "degrading"; and their wage
packets were being progressively eaten away by the continuous
increase in prices. As many testified to the Moffatt
Commission - prices were up; taxes and school fees consumed
most of their income; and they could neither clothe themselves
and their families, nor afford to feed their children.122 The
Natalspruit compound was first to react; and it was only after
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fifty arrests had been made that the trouble was put down.
Fifty arrests however meant fifty vacancies and when
Bezuidenhout Valley compound refused to do their Natalspruit
colleagues1 work, thirteen more ended up behind bars. The
climax of the episode was, however, yet to come. Those in the
Vrededorp compound allocated to the vacant jobs were extremely
unwilling to comply. First they demanded - and were promised
double pay - and then on the 9th and 10th they too decided that
blacklegging was not for them, and refused to go out to work.
Wolhuter Compound adopted a similar attitude, and Springfield
was described as "wavering and unwilling".1 3 The upshot was
152 arrests and the callous sentence handed down by Magistrate
McFie (see above). The fat was truly in the fire. Congress
and the African public generally were outraged and the 1/- a
day dampaign was about to commence.
The first TNC meeting on the matter was held on the evening
of the 10th, although its executive, through the offices of
Letanka, had taken up the case of the strikers when the first
arrests were made.124 Its proceedings soon revealed many of
the cleavages, as well as the pre-occupations, that were to
characterise Congress over the next two years. Maghato,
President of SANNC, opened the proceedings by observing that
the municipal workers had struck because they were united and
had been arrested because of the pass laws. If the blacks
just folded up their arms and stopped work, they would surely
hurt the white man. H.L. Bud Mbelle, by contrast, proposed
that they should petition the Governor General, for a
relaxation of the penalty, to which Mtota (probably an IWA
member) retorted they should forget the Governor General and
if no satisfaction was given they should strike. I. Bud Mbelle
(fifteen years interpreter in the High Court in Kimberley) then
intervened and made a plea for moderation, which he thought-
fully made available to the Moffatt Commission. "In coming
here tonight", he announced,
we have not come to pray, we are here on a very
important matter. In rising I wish to express my
concurrence with the proposal of Mbelle Junior,
opposing altogether Mtota's proposal. My countrymen,
do not forget we are in a critical time. Do not
forget that we have not a single greyheaded man among
us, therefore when the fat is in the fire we must
remove it ourselves. We must extinguish the fire
when we see it burning outside ... the Congress at
Bloemfontein decided that its sentiment was against
any form of strike. We have therefore also to be
careful about what we do and must avoid putting our
people into trouble ... If we do not stop the strike
the whole of Johannesburg will be in flames ... I
therefore entreat you to stop the strike. I entreat
you to help those people financially, protect them
and help them in the appeal required against the
Magistrate's judgement. At the same time, let us
make it quite clear that we are opposed to strikes.
Bud Mbelle however was clearly out of his depth. "Let it
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burn" (whether it was the fat or Johannesburg we are never
informed), was the audiences1 reply, and Mbelle retired in
disarray.125 The working class was already beginning to
exercise its pull.
At this stage the proceedings of the meeting become shrouded
in mystery. The Moffatt Commissioners obviously had secret
police reports of the meeting which I have not been able to
trace, when they interrogated (literally) those prominent in
the agitation, and from their cross questioning it appears that
preparations were now undertaken, at the direction of Mvabasa,
to organise a strike. One man, Mhlonga, was apparently
detailed to canvass the idea in Springs, another was to work
between Cleveland and Block B, and a third was given responsi-
bility for Randfontein and Roodepoort.126 Still others were
charged with visiting white employers and white households to
propogate the idea among their employees, the name of a
newspaper vendor called Shabalala being mentioned in this
context.127 On the 11th, if Moffatt's evidence is to be
believed, a report-back took place, and on the 13th or 15th at
a meeting at the African Club, the Springs and Benoni delegates
detailed the progress.128 Witnesses naturally denied these
allegations when confronted with them by the Moffatt Commission,
but there was one piece of evidence to suggest something of
this kind was undertaken. On June 26 a worker reported that
about two weeks before a man had come to his place of employ-
ment and invited them to a meeting (presumably that of the
19th).129
For Isaac Bud Mbelle and the older, more established and
more affluent section of Congress things were now getting
thoroughly out of control. On 13 June he telegrammed the
Minister of Justice in the following appeal:
Honourable Sir ... Your attention may already have
been drawn to the severe criticisms of Mr. McFie's
remarks that appeared in the daily Press of *'
Johannesburg and other centres, characterising the
sentence on strikers as unduly severe. In addition
I have the honour to inform your honour that this
has created an unfortunate situation for the leaders
of our Congress, as it has had a painful effect upon
the native labourers of the Rand. During the past
three days matters grew so serious that two days ago
I telegraphed for the senior officers of our congress
to help calm the natives. Mr. Mgato, our President,
Mr. Saul £sic7 Plaatje, Mr. Saul M'aana /sic7 and the
senior Vice President, Mr. D.S. Letanka have had
various consultations with the native sections on the
Rand, which culminated in a largely attended public
meeting at the Pilkington Hall last night, of which
this application is the result. I think we have
most of their machinations under control, but as I
understand that some counter meetings are to take
place under socialist auspices next Sunday and
Wednesday, the Government would strengthen our hands
considerably by extending its clemency to the
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prisoners, and by altering Mr. McFie's decision before
the week-end. 13°
By this stage one further public meeting had been held
(excluding the more clandestine affairs referred to by Moffatt),
and one was impending. On the 12th Maghato chaired a gather-
ing of two hundred blacks and three whites, whose main business
was Sol Plaatjefs investigation of some shootings in the
Free State. Mabaso, however, took the opportunity to give
vent to some deeper frustrations. Referring to a speech in
Parliament four years before which allegedly posed the question
how best to destroy the natives, Mabaso provided his own answer,
"Put them in a barren place where nothing will grow and there
is fever" (i.e. Klipspruit). This was a theme to which Mabasa
would return in later addresses. Clearly the militant atmos-
phere on the Rand had unblocked something in Mabaso's mind.131
The meeting of the 19th was far more significant. Until
this point no single formal demand had been made for an
increase in wages, although it is safe to assume that
complaints had been registered from the floor at Congress
meetings. That, and the whole direction of the TNC over the
next two years was about to be changed. The meeting was some-
thing of a set piece occasion. A thousand Africans attended
(and twelve whites) , who had travelled in from all parts of the
Rand; the hall was overflowing; and all the TNC dignitaries
were there - Maghato, Mabaso, Msane, Letanka, Msimang, Mbelle,
Maxexe and others. The Reverend Lebala opened with a prayer,
but from that moment a different spirit gripped the assembled
throng. Mabaso started with what was to become a familiar
diatribe against the location system:
He pointed out Klipspruit and Germiston location as
the place of the natives where all the dirt from the
towns is deposited or thrown. This aims at making
natives bring forth unhealthy children, who would
soon die away.
The Union Government, he continued, was asking to take control
of the late German colonies:
We oppose the idea. We are in hell and do not wish
that our brethren come to this place of torments.
Charlotte Maxexe took up the same point of the genocidal
policies of the white population. After protesting that:
in order to get a living most of the girls and women
are engaging in the illicit liquor trade and ended
up in goal,
she noted,
The white people try to prevent the natives from
increasing. Natives in the compounds are innocu-
lated every Sunday.
- a statement which was to get her into hot water with the
Moffatt Commission.
Mvabasa and Selope Thema then launched into an attack on
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Christian missionaries and Christian teaching:
The white people teach you about heaven and tell you
that after death you will go to a beautiful land in
heaven. They don't teach you about this earth on
which we live ... if we cannot get land on this earth
neither shall we get it in heaven ... The God of our
Chiefs, Chaka, Moshoeshoe, Rile, Sandile, Sobuza,
Leutsoe etc. gave us this part of the world we
possess.
 ( M v a b a s a )
The Missionaries have taught us to follow the saying
"Do unto others as you would that they to you should
do", but they endorse the terrible laws for natives.
They teach us to think about God while they tell
their brethren to take our land of our Chiefs ... Has
Christ come to rob us of our land? God gave this
part of the earth to the black people. He taught us
our customs. There is no heaven on earth. We must
have a place on earth, never mind about heaven.
What is interesting about these speeches aside from their
evident passion, is the transformation of consciousness which
they seem to entail. The logical inconsistency of elements in
their previous ideological discourse had been revealed;
Christian values like submissiveness and expecting your due
reward in heaven had been found wanting and discredited. In
their place we see in process the construction of a new
ideological unity with popular appeals to the land of our
chiefs, the God who brought us our customs being re-integrated
into a new populist discourse. Politically and ideologically
the tide was on the turn.
As significant are the continued cleavages within Congress
that emerge at this meeting. All were infected by the atmos-
phere of the gathering, but there was a limit to which some of
the leadership would go. Maghato, for example, swam with the
tide in his rhetorical passages and used the appropriate
biblical imagery of the Children of Israel in the Land of the
Pharoes, but mainly in the hope of diverting the agitation into
safer less violent channels. "The International Socialists ..
and the Labour Parties", he argued,
are all white people. I understand they want the
natives to strike. If you listen to them and go out
on strike they will be the very persons who will be
around with rifles to shoot you in the street. I am
absolutely opposed to the idea of a strike. I main-
tain that we shall get our grievances rectified if we
only ask through the proper channels ... I tell you
we are are not afraid of white people. We can
destroy Johannesburg in a day; we can stop the mines
in an hour. But we respect the Union Jack and are
loyal to the British Government.
(this last was of course a characteristic element of the
earlier ideological discourse).
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Mabaso, always to the left of Maghato adopted a more quali-
fied position:
There is a section of white people called the
International Socialist League- These men appear to
sympathise with black people •.. I cannot tell
whether these men are honest or not ... ^but7 in my
opinion they are friends of the black people.
But it was left to Mvabasa to articulate the militant class
position in its most unadulterated form. To the horror of his
more moderate colleagues on the platform he moved a resolution,
seconded by Thema, that Congress request the authorities and
employers to increase wages of black workers by 1/- a day as of
1 July 1918. in motivating his motion he made the following
remarks, which clearly betray the influence of the ISL, whose
meetings Mvabasa had attended since late the previous year.
"The capitalists and workers", he said,
are at war everywhere in every country ... The white
workers do not write to the Governor General when
they want more pay. They strike and get what they
should.
Despite interventions by the Reverend Lebalo and Caluza,
which were respectively ignored or shouted down, the die was
now well and truly cast. It only remained for Herbert Msane
of the ISL to propose a secret committee of five from the ISL
and TNC (to avoid detectives) to work on a strategy and for a
collection to be made before the main business of the meeting
was over.132
From the report of Native Detective Moorosi (there were
several others which confirm the general content of the
speeches), it would appear that no decision was actually taken
on the question of a strike, although this was clearly the
sanction that was in the back of peoples' minds if the 1/-
request was rejected. Another informer, however, came away
with a different view. According to him, Mvabasa had proposed
that another meeting be called before the 1st July, and if the
employers did not acceed a strike would take place on the
second.133 This was certainly the impression gained by the
meeting at large. While Mvabasa and Herbert Msane denied at
an IWA meeting of 27 June that any such decision had been taken,
most of the others who were present (Sebeho, Ntholi, Tinker and
Ngoji) insisted that it had.*34 "All the natives on the Rand
knew it", asserted Comrade Ntholi and he is supported by a
report from the employees of Felber and Jucken whose recollec-
tion of the meeting was. "more pay, the abolition of passes and
stop work on 1st July".*35 Even for the more radical wing of
Congress the situation was getting out of control.
If the Congress leaders were becoming uneasy the Government
was also clearly getting cold feet. To begin with, they had
taken up an extremely hard and uncompromising line. When it
had seemed that the municipality might be caving in to the
municipal strikers1 demands, the Magistrate, Johannesburg, the
Deputy Commissioner of Police and the Acting Assistant Director
of Native Labour, had written to the council in the following
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peremptory terms:
We desire to state for the information of the Council
that for the Council at the present time to consider
even, much more to concede, any claim of bodies of
native servants of the Municipality for an increase
of wages is a course which would, in our judgement,
be fraught with the most serious danger, not only to
industry but also to public safety on the
Witwatersrand.
We desire also to state formally for the information
of the Council that the Government is prepared to
deal sternly and immediately with any criminal dis-
order by the Natives or by Europeans should any dis-
order follow from a refusal of the Council to
consider the question. We wish to repeat that for
the Council even to consider such claims, is in our
opinion fraught with the most serious danger to the
public welfare.136
The prospect of a general strike of black workers quickly
concentrated their minds. On the 14th, the Minister of
Justice replied to Mbelle's telegram, saying he would place it
before his colleagues at the earliest opportunity; and
opportunely, from the point of view of the timing of the strike,
the Director of Prisons was able to inform Mbelle on 26 June
that the Governor General had agreed to the release of the
Municipal workers on probation.*37
The Congress and IWA leaders were getting more than a little
jittery themselves. On 13 June 118 workers at Premier Milling
had struck for higher pay, to be followed by nearly 500 workers
from eight other firms (not all had struck work by many gave a
month's notice when pay increases were refused).138 Nor was
trouble confined to industrial plants. From 20th or 21st
Taberer reports it became apparent "that there was an uneasy
feeling among the natives on some of the mines", while shortly
afterwards workers from Crown Deep went to Western Section to
propagate the strike.139
The Committee of five responded with an attitude of masterly
inactivity. H.L. Bud Mbelle issued a circular to all
employers on the Witwatersrand on 20 June, drawing attention to
the increase in prices and to the fact that, "the native
workers of the Rand are a valuable and perhaps indispensable
class of the community", and requesting an increase of 1/- a
day, but beyond that little was done.1^0 Part of the reason
was that no-one was clear whether a strike call had been made
on the 19th. In any case, as Mvabasa pointed out, it was
foolish to strike on the first day of the demand.1^1 Equally
important, however in the eyes of Tinker, Ntholi and other
members of the ISL/IWA was the belief that the black working
class was not yet well organised enough to strike.142
It came as some relief therefore when the bucket boys were
released and other overtures were forthcoming from the authori-
ties. Taberer met Letanka, Msimang ,and Mbelle to warn them
that black workers would be shot if they struck and that the
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mines would close down, while General Botha received a
delegation to hear grievances and promised an enquiry would be
made.143 All the co-optive strategies were being quickly
brought to bear.
Nevertheless, the terms upon which different parties to the
movement made their capitulation varied according to their
ideological and political creed. Mvabasa, at a meeting on 28
June, attended by some 1 000 Africans, was at pains to denounce
rumours of a July 1st strike and to explain why there should be
delay:
I see that some of you think that we are too slow
with the thing, but it is not so, we are first trying
to make you understand and put you on the right way
because we don't want any of you to be hurt or get
into trouble.
He went on to explain what the right way would be:
... our strike won't be like the white man's strike.
You could see the white men whey they pick stones
and break the stores etc., stop all the trams and
railways ... we won't do /that/... but will be in
our blankets naked ... ana we~shall then see if any
Government servant will then come and shoot you
. while:lying in your bed fighting nobody ... You
must leave your sticks behind in case you strike
the white men will say you were assaulting them
with sticks ... the Sanitary boys were arrested
while having sticks with them ... we natives of
Johannesburg are to show the other natives of South
-Africa. If we do a thing every native in
South Africa will do it; as you have seen in the
papers that Natal is shaking, asking for more money,
and it will be the same in the Cape and the Free
State ... the whole of South Africa will one day go
• i 14 4
on strike
Comrade Ntholi begged to differ on Mvabasa1s rather naive
approach. On the mines, he accurately predicted,
the white people will place a few armed Policemen or
soldiers at the gates ^and7--. the poor natives will
be starved into submission in less than two days.
As for kitchen and shop 'boys':
the boss will only kick him and he will go out to
work. He himself /would not7 sleep on a strike day.
He /would7 fight any man that came his way.145
Yet for all these differences of emphasis it is clear the
strike idea was still alive and well in the minds of some of
the Congress leadership.
Those who had always been opposed to the movement were no
more convinced. Saul Msane, an old Congress leader, circu-
lated a pamphlet denouncing strike action, which was subse-
quently reproduced in the white Sunday press, which was to earn
him widespread approbrium and the title Isita sa Bantu (Enemy
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of the Natives).146 .Maghato at a further meeting of 29th
attended by 900 blacks and three whites struck a more ambiguous
note. Once again his speech was laced with militant rhetoric:
The God of the white people was Gold, their heaven
was money ... We are told by the missionaries that
there is a place called Hell, he cannot pray because
the devil won't have that nonsense in his place. We
black people in this land are in hell already, the
owner of the hell, which is the white man will not
allow the blacks to pray ... the blacks are tormented
in this land and the white man does what he likes.
At the same time it was riddled with contradictions.
McFie has opened our eyes and made us see what we had
never seen before. The natives have been made to
realise their power and its utility ... They know by
organising they can make their voices heard. The
white people have got maxim guns ready to shoot
unarmed natives ... the white people are afraid to
talk with us because they know well they would be
defeated. I am loyal to the King. I am not afraid
of General Botha as I am keeping within the law.
Clearly if anyone was grappling with an identitfy crisis it
was Maghato, as he continually vacillated between the two sides.
I. Bud Mbelle was clearer - he supported the 1/- demand (he
hardly dare not) , but he was absolutely "against any idea of
strike". Mvabasa was clearer still. If people were opposed
to the strike they should hold their own meetings. "If the
1/- increase is not given we shall certainly strike."147
Nevertheless, it appeared that for the time being at least
the strike had been postponed. On the following day (Sunday),
partly at the instance of Dower of the Department of Native
Affairs, a mass meeting was held at New Market, Newtown,
attended by "thousands of natives" which Maghato addressed,
telling them there was no strike, and that they would be told
what to do the following Sunday. The Secretary for Native
Affairs, Dower, also spoke, eliciting a noisy response, above
which nothing could be heard. When Dower departed, Ntholi,
who had draped the Union Jack around his body, publicly tore it
to shreds. The report concludes, "the natives were very angry
and making rows, some white men hitting them etc."148
The leadership might have compromised but as the foregoing
report suggests the workers were in no mood to be fobbed off,
On July 1st "Practically all the natives employed by the
various firms ... put forward an application for an increase of
wages at a rate of_1/- a day", and were waiting for a reply.
11
... all disclaim^ed7 any intention of striking, but I ^E. Berg,
Town Inspector/ very much doubt whether they will continue that
attitude were they to meet a general refusal".149 Others were
no so long suffering. Several industrial concerns struck,
while at Ferreirasdorp, Robinson Deep and Crown Mines, 4 000,
several hundred (?) and 2 OOO mineworkers respectivel refused
to go down the shafts, only complying once they had been
charged by bayonet and rifle-wielding police.
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Opposition had been temporarily stifled by a mixture of
force, disagreement and confusion in the ranks of the Congress
leadership, and the conciliatory noises being made by the
authorities. At the meeting at Newtown Market, a message had
been delivered by Dower from the Prime Miniter (which nobody
had hear above the din) announcing the appointment of the
Moffatt Commission. A few days later, on 9 July, Prime
Minister Botha graciously agreed to entertain a deputation of
the black community to listen to their grievances. The list
they presented was a judicious mixture of working class and
petty bourgeois concerns, providing plenty of scope for
cosmetic concessions,.and is worth reproducing in full.
TABLE III
LIST OF GRIEVANCES151
(a) The conomic position of the natives on the Rand having
regard to:-
(1) increased cost of living due to the war;
(2) the consequent dersire for increased wage;
(3) housing accommodation in the case of those not
directly employed on the mines and the incidental
disadvantages of the existing systems;
(4) inability under existing conditions to give proper
support to wife and family, more particularly in the
case of those resident in labour areas;
(5) disabilities and disadvantages imposed by "the colour
bar" in law and the consequent artificial inter-
ference with progress;
(6) payment of compensation in respect of miners'
phthisis, death or incapacitation from accident;
(b) enforcement of the Night Passes Ordinance in respect of
women;
(c) non-availability of letters of exemption in the different
provinces owing to the operation of the different pre-
Union laws;
(d) restriction on employment of natives as interpreters in
Courts of Law;
(e) non-employment of natives in post offices and unsuit-
ability of post office accommodation for natives;
(f) multiplicity of passes in labour districts;
(g) residential passes and disadvantages owing to the distance
of the native locations from the towns, together with a
request for suitable housing provisions;
(h) lack of facilities for education.
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On 24 July a further delegation was admitted, representing
black residents in the Pretoria district. The process of
token conciliation was clearly in full swing.152
The latter part of 1918 marks a lull in African opposition,
and this is perhaps the appropriate point to draw some general
conclusions about the agitation that emerged. One thing that
is absolutely clear is that for the Congress leadership at
least, and probably also for the mass of the African working
population, these events provided the first full realisation of
the strength of the organised working class. As Saul Msane
said in evidence to the Moffatt Commission,
The masses in the native population are beginning to
realise that they are an indispensable factor in the
natural and social fabric of South Africa. They are
beginning to see that the whole industrial system in
this land is based and must be based on their willing
co-operation.153
Numerous speeches at meetings in this period corroborate
this impression. Also apparent is the polarisation among the
leadership of the TNC. The older, better established section
who were also frequently residentially divided from the working
class (e.g. Msane lived in Bree Street)154, proved extremely
reluctant to throw their lot in with the working people, having
more to lose in terms of their standing with the authorities,
and the favours which this might ultimately provide. On the
other side, there were those whose outlook was profoundly
transformed by this period of working class mobilisation -
people like Mabaso, H.C. Bud Mbelle, Selope Thema, Mvabasa, and
to a certain extent Letanka too. Nor should the influence of
the ISL and IWA be underestimated here - as it often is - since
it was their members (Ntholi, Kraai, Cetiwe, Sebeho. and others)
who often held the line when it came to more militant action.
Finally, there were those - most classically Maghato - who were
caught between and remorselessly pulled two ways, men who were
nevertheless important in Congress because they could speak to
both factions, and who eventually helped it back on a constitu-
tionalist path.
The Moffatt Commission's recommendations which were pub-
lished in September were received differently by different
sections of the black population. Another meeting was called
by the Prime Minister to acquaint Congress with the substance
of its findings, though Botha in the event was indisposed.
Secretary for Native Affairs, Malan, stepped into the breach .
and announced concessions on the following issues:
1. Recommend increases in .wages for those permanently
resident in towns nor enjoying the benefit of employer-
provided accommodation and rations.
2. "• Wage increases for black soldiers and policemen in the
SAMR and SAVfi] (5/- a month for a single man - up to 12/6
a month for a married man, plus a war bonus for those
married and earning over 3/6d a day), and special allow-
ances not exceeding 25/- a month for those employed in the
higher ranks of interpreters.
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3. Conciliation boards (under very restricted circumstances) .
4. Removal of the 1/- a day fee for a travelling pass.
5. Removal of night passes for women.
6. Improved Post Office accommodation for blacks with the
possibility of employing black clerks being under
consideration.
7. Court interpreters to be chosen exclusively on the basis
of merit.
8. Attempts in progress to improve black education.
9. Pending the passage of the Native Affairs Administration
Bill, ad hoc conferences to be convened between the
Minister of Native Affairs and black representatives.15
While some were mollified by these concessions (and the
Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce agreed to a 25% increase over
pre-war rates of pay in the categories Moffatt specified)156,
the vast majority were not. Moffatt had barely touched on the
broader structures of exploitation and oppression, and as
inflation bit deeper a further explosion was on the cards. As
early as late August/beginning of September, at a meeting in
Johannesburg, "one firebrand ... wanted those present to urge
the natives along the reef to come out on strike", until,
"Wiser and saner counsels prevailed and it was decided to wait
until the Moffatt Report was published".157 And at the SANNC
Annual Conference at Blpemfontein, at about the same time,
Sol Plaatje was horried*at the attitude of the Transvaal
delegates:
/Thev7 came to the Congress with a concord and deter-
mination that was perfectly astounding to our
customary native demeanour at conferences. They
spoke almost in unison, in short sentences nearly all
of which began and ended with the word "strike" ...
It was only late in the second day that we succeeded
in satisfying the delegates to report, on getting to
their homes, that the Socialist method of putting
black against white will land our people in serious
disaster ...l58
The influenza epidemic of September/October 1918 temporarily
took the steam out of further agitation, but by December of that
year Congress was once again meeting with Malan, the Secretary
for Native Affairs, and parading a familiar list of.
complaints-159 They received short shrift from the Secretary,
although he couched his responses in the most courteous manner.
The colour bar could not be removed due to pressure of public
opinion, and the use of force would only have the effect of
alienating whites; the cost of living would go down now that
the war was over; the concession stores were not exploiting
their custom; passes did not exist for slavery but for mutual
protection and would gradually disappear as blacks moved up the
scale of civilisation; housing was high on the Government's
agenda; and if the complaints about post offices remained he
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would bring it to the attention of the Minister.160
Nevertheless inflation kept on rising; no new housing was
forthcoming; and passes continued to be viewed as the princi-
pal means of obstructing higher pay. Early in 1919 therefore
African leaders began, in the words of Johnstone, to advance a
new tactic in the campaign for extra wages - passive resistance
against passes.161
The anti-pass campaign precipitated one of the more dramatic
expressions of African cross class unity to be seen in this
period - not surprisingly since the common, but by no means
uniform, incidence of the pass laws across the African popu-
lation served as a focus of grievance for virtually all classes.
On 3 April the newspaper Abantu Batho reported that the
previous Sunday (March 30), the delegation which interviewed
the NAD, the Chamber of Mines, the NRC and the Municipal
Council on the question of the 1/- a day had held a mass
meeting to communicate the substance of the discussion. "The
report", according to Abantu Batho, "didn't please the meeting
as this question was an old one. It was therefore agreed that
passes be thrown away as passes are the foundation on which the
refusal of the Europeans is based."162
One question arises at this stage, which Johnstone for one
does not adequately answer.163 Why did the focus shift so
suddenly from wages to passes when no serious demand for their
outright abolition had been voiced until this stage?
Obviously, the connection between passes and wages had been
made as early as June 1918, but as the Rand Dail Mail commented/
in successive meetings with the authorities in October and
December 1918, and again on March 21 of that year, the question
had simply not been raised in that form.164
The answer emerges from the meeting between the TNC and
various employer bodies that preceeded the March 30 meeting.
Cooke had been asked there to appeal to the employers in
getting higher wages, but had replied he had no power to inter-
fere.165 If employers would not respond to the Commission's
recommendations and Government urgings, and if pass laws
prevented the successful prosecution of strikes, then the
obvious target was the Pass Laws themselves. It was here it
seems that the link was finally made.
The movement got into full stride the following day.
Lawrence, Acting Chief Pass Officer, arrived at his office at
8.30 the next morning to find a large gathering being
addressed by Mbelle and Mabaso. After brief discussion he
agreed to receive a delegation consisting of Mabaso, Mbelle,
E. Dunjwa, Cetiwe, Nshoko, G. Mapikela, Kraai, J. Khatlane and
two others. The message they delivered was that after repeat-
ed representations they had received no increase in wages and
they had therefore decided to refuse to carry passes.166
Lawrence made the unremarkable observation that they would be
breaking the law, after which they proceeded to hold a mass
meeting at Von Brandis Square, and hundreds present began to
hand in their passes. In the afternoon, pickets proceeded to
the suburbs demanding passes from employees in white businesses,
and collected probably 2 000 or more.16' The following day
threatened even more militant agitation. The Director of
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Native Labour cabled the Native Affairs Department in Pretoria
that the movement was still growing and that a meeting of 3 000
blacks had been in progress for the last four hours. A cordon
of friendly pickets surrounded the meeting which would only
allow entry if passes were surrendered. At this stage inade-
quate polic forces were available and he urged the despatch of
the SAMR. Such action, he added, would not complicate the
European strike, members of which fully appreciated the native
unrest.158 Much the same pattern of events was expected for
the 2nd, it having been decided on the previous day that a new
mass meeting should be held; that all blacks working in town
were to be pulled out by pickets - special attention being
given to the municipal compounds; that mine clerks were to co-
operate in getting the mine labourers to come out; and that
delegates from Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Boksburg and Benoni
were to secure the surrender of passes and the cessation of
work in those areas.169 Police reinforcements being by now
available however, the strike leaders were arrested and a large
crowd followed the arrested to the charge office. Here,
further demonstrations took place and further arrests were
made.170 Finally, on the 3rd, mounted police charged a large
crowd demonstrating at the Court, many being injured and many
arrests being made.
Sporadic incidents occurred for the rest of the month.
Violent clashes took place between black and white civilians in
Vrededorp on the 3rd and 4th, resulting in 108 arrests; on the
9th, when a meeting was urged to release the prisoners from
gaol; on the 14th, when those arrested on the 4th handed in
their gaol tickets and with other passless Africans were
arrested once more; and on the 25th, when an unsuccessful
attempt was made on a police escort taking prisoners from the
court house to gaol, a total of 306 being detained on these
occasions.171 Meanwhile similar outbursts were taking place
all over the Rand. Benoni was perhaps most seriously affected.
At a meeting on the 2nd, fifteen arrests were made after which
large crowds gathered at the charge office behaving, in the
language of the police report, in a disorderly fashion. 69
women and 49 men were thereupon arrested, to which the crowd
responded by stoning the police escort. On the 3rd 100
Africans appeared carrying a sack containing their passes and
67 arrests were made, and on the 4th all available European
constables were summoned to round up twenty male Africans who
were travelling the district "spreading disaffection among the
mine natives". In total 231 arrests had been made.1
Similar episodes were reported from Maraisburg and Springs in
which latter instance fifty ringleaders were incarcerated in
gaol.173Only Boksburg for a time seemed relatively immune,
owing largely to the "moderation" of its branch chairman
Wessells Morake. As early as February 1919 there had been
agitation against passes, but this had been successfully
stifled by Morake's insistence that they keep within the law.
An E.R.P.M. clerk, J.G. Matshiqi soon put an end to that.
With the support of the radical Johannesburg branch, and
physical reinforcements from Johannesburg, Germiston and Benoni,
he arranged counter meetings, against the express ruling of the
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Location Superintendent, to advocate the destruction of passes.
Morake, "a moderate man" in the old SANNC mould, naturally-
informed the Superintendent with the result that a fracas broke
out when the Police and the Superintendent arrived, and sixty
arrests were made.174
What conclusions can we draw from this new phase of
political radicalisation? Firstly, although it cannot be
traced so readily through the minutes of meetings, the process
of polarisation was still going on. At the very beginning of
the disturbances Maghato hurried off to the Native Sub-
Commissioner, Pretoria, to say that the situation was getting
out of control.175 On the other hand it was the familiar
figures of Mabaso, H.L. Bud Mbelle, E, Dunjwa, Cetiwe and Kraai
who led the march to the Pass Office which started the affair.
At the same time we see a new element entering the agitation,
no doubt because it was passes that were under attack - the
lumpenproletariat of Vrededorp and other urban slums. Of the
316 arrested on 4 April in the Vrededorp disturbances, 45 had
previous convictions for serious crimes, 15 for desertion, and
10 for minor offences (for example, pass laws, drunkeness,
habitual loafing). One enterprising individual had 26
previous convictions, another 22, one 15 pass law offences, and
another two had convictions for uttering passes. A similar
pattern emerged from the arrests of the 14th.17 Clearly a
new and dangerous element was entering the movement, with the
arrival of the lumpen urban mob, which was to prompt serious
reflection as to what course of action to pursue with the
radicalised petty bourgeoisie.
A section of the TNC leadership now seems to have drawn back
from the brink. The violence unleashed by the anti-pass
disturbances, from workers and the lumpenproletariat, as well
as from the police, seems to have given rise to serious
misgivings. Officical soft-soaping once more served to
reinforce this feeling. On 1 July 1918 DNL Pritchard summoned
a TNC delegation to announce the appointment of the low grades
mines commission, and suggested that Congress itself might
wish to give evidence. But if they did, he counselled that
they "should go with a clean slate. A great blunder had been
made by them in starting the 'Throw away passes1 agitation",
and he advised them to consider what their attitude would be.
He was prepared to grant all blacks who had thrown away their
passes one week's grace to go to the various pass offices and
get duplicate passes.
The deputation then retired and on returning thanked Colonel
Pritchard for his offer. They admitted they had made a great
blunder, and gratefully accepted his offer. Pritchard can
hardly have been able to contain his satisfaction and went on
to consolidate his gains. The FIRD and the character column
on passes, he said, had already been abolished, and his
objective was to get the Government to agree to a far more
liberal granting of exemptions from passes, such exemptions
being given free. He felt "a great majority of natives would
still require a lot of control, but the exempted ones would
gradually make a buffer population and readily increase".
Clearly the spectre of a militant petty bourgeoisie once again
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unleashing the passions of the urban mob and working class was
one that he was anxious to exorcise straight away. Concluding,
he went on to further sugar the pill by reporting that an inter-
Departmental Pass Laws Committee was about to be set up, and
that he was having discussions with the municipality to
expedite the provision of housing and to see what could be done
about prosecutions in Klipspruit for illicit brewing of
liquor.177
Reporting to a TNC meeting in Vrededorp on 6 July, Mabaso
got a hotter reception than he can possibly have expected.
Thibedi cross-questioned him about his position, eliciting the
accusation that "he was only a youngster and would get us into
trouble", and another unnamed member of the audience bluntly
accused Mabaso of being bribed- At this Mabaso promptly
closed the meeting, and was only with difficulty saved from
public assault. The meeting was only rescued when Mbelle
pointed out that Mabaso was only reporting back and if they
were not in agreement another interview should be arranged.178
At meetings on the 8th and 10th similar criticisms were
voiced, it being argued that Pritchard would inform the
Commission of Enquiry that blacks had no grievances against
passes now they had agreed to take them back. On the 8th
Mabaso tried to defend his position by saying, "We have broken
the law: Congress has no money to assist workers. It behoves
us to be penitent and to honour the Director who will intercede
for us". However, like Maghato before him he was clearly
being pulled two ways, and at the meeting of the 10th he
finally caved in. "Those who want to follow the Director's
advice", he argued, "can. For those who don't I inform you of
a General Strike in the Transvaal on October 1st". Already
three "natives" were organising for a strike in Potchefstroom,
Middelburg and Rustenburg.179 (Another police report of the
meeting confirmed the above as substantially correct with the
sole exception of the date of the strike. According to this
what was said was that every possible endeavour would be made
to bring about a strike.)
The militant constituency of Congress seemed to be maintain-
ing its grip, but another movement was stirring which was
ultimately to create a new set of rifts. On the 19th March
Maghato reported that he and Chief Maghato had collected
R41.18.6 at Potchefstroom and £10 on farms at Delmas. What
this heralded was a new move into the countryside and a closer
alliance with the chiefs. Maghato in particular was suscept-
ible to this shift, being the son of Kgorutle Ratad Maghato
(chief of the tribe at Mphahlele), and the grandson of Chief
Maghato of the Zoutpansberg area.*81 His attitude to rural
society and to the benign egalitarian rule of chiefs is best
captured in his speech to a Congress meeting in June 1918.
"In our rule", he said, "we did not distinguish the poor
because the poor got cattle given him by the Chief to maintain
his family".182 What Maghato failed to realise, however, was
that the position of chiefs had changed, and the alliance that
he fostered became an increasingly conservative drag. Never-
theless, what was in the making was a rural populist movement
which was ultimately to reach fruition after the decline of
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urban agitation in mid 1920. In May 1919, for example,
reports reached Johannesburg of Maghato's trip to
Bronkhorstspruit where he urged the destruction of passes, and
of his continued perigrinations into the Lydenburg district.183
Of the other Congress leaders, Ramailane seemed the most prone
to this approach. At a Congress meeting on 23 November, he
urged his audience to approach the Government in a constitu-
tional fashion, and they would gradually obtain their rights,
citing the example of Chief Griffiths of Basutoland who had
just made a visit to England.184 An additional influence here
may have been the impending arrival of the SANNC delegates from
Versailles, which had temporarily diverted Congress1 attention,
for on the 23rd Ramailane announced to his perplexed audience
that "he was able to give them great news". All the Transvaal
Chiefs were going to travel to Basutoland to consult with Chief
Griffiths about his trip overseas.185
Conservative chiefly ideology was gradually penetrating
Congress and even Mabaso became infected by the spirit of the
times. On the 8th February 1920, just before the black mine-
workers1 strike, he spoke out strongly against Africans causing
any trouble over the £2 Poll Tax of the Transvaal. The Native
Congress and the chiefs, he added, were not in favour of
strikes, but wanted to submit to the laws of the country
trusting that in the end the Government would redress their
grievances. The "mabalans" (clerks) at Crown Mines, he went
on, should use all their influence in preventing trouble taking
place, adding that the Transvaal chiefs were going to
Basutoland to hear Chief Griffiths1 report.186 Mabaso
returned to the same theme on 20th and 22nd February.
Congress did not want to go against the Government. It was
trusted by the chiefs who regarded it as an intermediary
between the authorities and "the natives".1 7
Chiefly influence and conservatism was clearly pulling a
section of the Congress leadership one way, and Ramailane was
at pains to emphasise that Congress had no part in the 1920
black mineworkers1 strike.188 Yet it was still not possible
to ignore more radical kinds of pressures being exercised on
the other wing of Congress or the political polarisation within
its ranks, that would persist until as late as 1921. At the
"native strike" meeting for example on 2O February, "a Zulu"
announced that he wanted to speak about the strike. "They
must do what they were told", he said, "because the strike was
organised and directed by educated people". The strike was to
take place on Monday morning, and the strike headquarters was
21 Delvers Street. Its telephone number was 5791 to which all
news should be sent.189 Similarly, in response to Mabaso1s
plea for moderation on 22 February, the crowd replied that
Congress had failed to accomplish anything, and their faith in
it had vanished. The only thing for them to do was to go out
on strike.l90
Other evidence of the continued radicalisation of Congress,
in at least its middle ranks, is supplied by a report of a
Congress meeting at Boksburg on 8 Feburary 1920. At this,
Ngoja got up and gave a speech in a more familiar vein;
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The black race must know that white people are thieves
and devils ... God did not want cowards. They must
look to the gaols as their homes. The mine natives
must know they are producers of wealth and must get
better pay ... There must be unity among blacks.
The town lights can be put out ... America said they
would free all natives and they will help ... America
had a black fleet and it is coming.191
A millenarian and apocalyptic vision was also beginning to
intrude. Which wing would win out in this battle would be the
product of changing rythms in the economic life of the country
and their effects on class struggles.
Some tentative hypotheses on this subject have been advanced
in an earlier paper I wrote on this period192; detailed ..
investigation, however, will have to await another time.
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